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A COMMENT ON THE AMENDMENTS TO
THE FEDERAL SECURITIES ACTS
Morris L. Forer t
On August 10, 1954, the Securities Act Amendments Act' was
signed by the President and went into effect on October 10, 1954.
In a session of Congress that saw the enactment of a changed income tax law and the shifting basis of the role of investigating committees, the passing of what may be denominated as technical revisions 2 is of minor legislative moment. It is. And yet as a history of
congressional and administrative interaction,' and as a nostalgic reminder of the dynamic days of New Deal legislation, it has its interest
t Member of the Philadelphia Bar.
1. 68 STAT. 683 (1954). Title I-Amendments to Securities Act of 1933, 48
STAT. 74 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §77a (1952)
(amending §§2(3),2(8),

2(10), 2(11), 3(a)(11), 4(1), 5, 10, 12, 17(a), 22(a)). Title II-Amendments
to Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 STAT. 881 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§78a (1952) (amending §§11(d), 12(d)). Title III-Amendments to Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 53 STAT. 1149 (1939), 15 U.S.C. §77aaa (1952) (amending
§§303(1), 303(2), 303(3), 303(4), 304(b), 305(c), 306, 324). Title IV-Amendments to Investment Company Act of 1940, 54 STAT. 789 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a
(1952) (amending §§ 2(a) (30), 24(d), adding § 24(e)).
2. The president of the New York Stock Exchange, G. Keith Funston, indicated to the Senate sub-committee conducting hearings on the amendments that the
exchange would "like at some future date to present . . . proposals which are not
included in this present bill because they do not fall in the category of technical
amendments." Hearings Before the Subcommittee on S. 2846 of the Senate Coininittee on Banking and Currency, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 78 (1954). There is a quasi-

official tendency to minimize the importance of the amendments.

Demmler &

Armstrong, The Federal Securities Law: The Scope and Effect of the New Amend-

nients, 41 A.B.A.J. 133, 135 (1955); see also Sent. Hearings, supra at 31. (Mr.
Demmler, chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, has recently resigned, and Mr. Armstrong, one of the commissioners, has been designated chairman.) But it is misleading to consider the 1954 amendments, to use a phrase of
the empirical philosopher of the Securities Act, Benjamin V. Cohen, as merely
"punctuation" amendments. The underlying amendments constitute a definite change
in the law and not merely an attempt "to simplify and clarify" the then existing
law, despite the many official statements to the contrary. See, e.g., Hearings Before
the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H.R. 7550 and
S. 2846, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1954) ; 100 CoNG. REc. 2343 (daily ed. March 2,
1954) ; 100 CoNG. REc. 6060 (daily ed. May 11, 1954); 20 SEC ANN. Ra,. 1 (1955);

cf. N.Y. Times, May 30, 1954, § 3, p. 1, col. 6; id., § 3, p. 5, col. 2.
3. See Lobell, Revisiom

of the Securities Act, 4& COL. L. REV. 313 (1948).

Since the background of this interaction was covered by Lobell and in the contemporaneous writings of Professors Byse & Bradley, Proposals To Amend The
Registration and Prospectus Requirements of the Securities Act of 1933, 96 U. OF

PA. L. REv. 609 (1948), and in one of the master law books of our time, Loss,
SacuRITias REGuLATION (1951) (see Forer, Book Review, 100 U. OF PA. L. REv.

927 (1952)), the page proof of whose 1955 supplement the present writer was privileged to review before its issue, it is substantially omitted in this article.
(1020)
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not only for the active practitioner in the securities field but also for
the student of politics."
The 1954 legislation constituted amendments to the important
federal regulatory statutes 5 involving the issue and sale of securities
and administered by the Securities and Exchange Commission.6
The acts administered by the Commission, with the possible exception of the Public Utility Holding Company Act 7 reflect the philosophy of minimal federal 8 governmental interference.'
The Securities Act,1" the first of the New Deal statutes dealing
with securities, is a disclosure statute, sometimes known as "truth
In the words of the present chairman of
in securities" legislation. 1
4. Despite accusations flung at the present members of the "partially" bipartisan
Commission (aggravated by its determination in such cases as the Dixon-Yates
integration and capital structure questions: Mississippi Valley Generating Company,
SEC, Summary of Holding Company Act Release 12794, Feb. 9, 1955, and by
constant references to the wishes and philosophy of the Eisenhower Administration,
when in fact the movement to amend the Securities Acts has reached at least its
confirmation age (see Demmler & Armstrong, supra note 2, at 133), the word
"politics" is not used invidiously.
5. All the statutes directly administered by the SEC were, amended with the
exception of the Public Utility Holding Company Act, 49 STAT. 803 (1935), 15

U.S.C. §79 (1952).
6. The Securities Act as originally enacted provided in § 2(5) for administration by the Federal Trade Commission, but 1934 amendments (§§ 210 and 211, Title
II of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 STAT. 908-09 (1934), 15 U.S.C.
§8 78ii-jj (1952)) transferred to the SEC all powers, duties and functions of the FTC.
7. See note 5 supra. See Dean, Book Review, 50 MICH. L. REV. 1388, 1392
(1952). The Public Utility Holding Company Act, as such, was not affected by the
act of 1954. During 1954, when Commission witnesses were appearing before the
congressional committees, the Commission was considering an ill-advised, radical
departure from Rule U-50 (in the application of which there had already been
serious inroads), requiring competitive bidding in the sale of securities by registered
holding companies and their subsidiaries. The chairman of the Commission found
himself on the defensive with respect to administration of a statute not even being
technically considered. House Hearings, supra note 2, at 55 et seq. In its annual
report the Commission casually dismissed the furor over Rule U-50. 20 SEC ANN.
RE'. 73-74 (1955).
8. There was no attempt by Congress in the Securities Act to pre-empt the
securities field. In the states divers blue sky laws govern, although in amendments
to the state statutes the procedures and concepts of the federal legislation were
intercalated. See, e.g., Illinois Securities Law of 1953, ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 1212,
§§ 137.1-137.19 (Supp. 1954), and rules promuliated thereunder. The inadequacy
of state legislation was, however, one prime argument for national legislation. See,
e.g., SEN. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1933). The main reasons for such
inadequacy were: ill-conceived and ineptly drafted statutes, limitation of their applicability, failure to provide for effective enforcement of such statutes, and the
interstate character of twentieth century business which made the evasion of state
blue sky laws an easy maneuver. U.S. DE'T OF COMMERCE, A STUDY OF THE
ECONOMIC AND LEGAL AspEcTs OF THE PROPoSED FEDERAL SECURrTIES

ACT, in Hear-

ings Before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreqn Cometrce on H.R.

4314, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 87, 100 (1933);

CHERRiNGrON, THE INVESTOR AND THE
SEcuaRTms AT 54 et seq. (1942). These inadequacies still prevail to a great extent.
9. Cf. LOEVINGER, THE LAW OF FREE ENTERiSE 281 (1949); Report of Com-

mittee of American Bar Association on Federal Regulation of Securities, 10
BUSINESS LAWYER

THE

73, 74 et seq. (Nov. 1954).

10. 48 STAT. 74 (1933), 15 U.S.C. §§77a-aa (1952).
11. The interesting and compelling antecedents to this legislation are traced
exhaustively by Loss, op. cit. supra note 3, c. 1, 3, and by a former commissioner
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the Commission, the act contains "requirements of disclosure by the
issuer [of securities] through a prospectus, publicly distributed, reflecting information .

.

. in a registration statement officially filed."

In addition, the act contains, and is based on, "the imposition of liability for misrepresentation and concealment in the registration statement and prospectus or in representations made by the seller." 1
Succinctly stated, the purposes of the act are "to prevent exploitation of the public by the sale of unsound, fraudulent and worthless
securities through misrepresentation; to place adequate and true information before the investor; to protect honest enterprise, seeking
capital by honest presentation, against the competition afforded by
dishonest securities offered to the public through crooked promotion;
to bring into productive channels of industry and development capital
which has grown timid to the point of hoarding; and to aid in providing employment and restoring buying and consuming power." -1
To respond to the legislative and financial challenge and especially
to provide dealers and investors with adequate information with respect to securities to be offered, the Securities Act, as in effect prior
to the 1954 amendments, employed a facile mechanism. New issues
of securities were to be registered. Unless a registration was in effect,
it was to be unlawful publicly to offer for sale or to sell securities,
except exempt securities, 4 in interstate commerce or through the
mails. During the period between the filing of the registration statement and the time it was to become effective (normally twenty days
although the Commission was given the power to accelerate this effective date "), the information contained in the registration stateof the SEC and at present head of the American Stock Exchange, McCoMiicE,
UNDERSTANDING THE SEcurrmEs Acr AND TE S.E.C. c. 1, 2 (1948); see also
Byse & Bradley, supra note 3, at 609 n.2, for contemporary bibliographical
references. The traumatic and seminal impact of the 1929 stock market crash on
a legislative generation (going into 1955 with the Fulbright security market "study"
investigation) has often been noted. Commissioner Armstrong, in a speech before
the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, on December 6, 1954 summarized the principal contributing causes of the 1929 stock market crash (SEC
Mimeo. p. 2). A recent judicial reference to security practices which led to the
Securities Act is in the replete, yet disappointing, anti-trust opinion, United States
v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621, 636 et seq. (S.D.N.Y. 1953) ; see Steffen, The Investment Bankers' Case: Soamw Observatios, 64 YALE L.J. 169 (1954); Whitney, The
Investment Bankers' Case-Including a Reply to Professor Steffen, 64 YAiz LJ.
319 (1955).
12. Demmler, Registration of Securities Under the Securities Act of 1933, 10
THE BusINass LAWYER 42, 43 (Nov. 1954).
13. 2 SEC ANN. REP. 1 (1936).

14. Section 3(a) provides a list of specifically exempted securities; §3(b)
allows the SEC to exempt issues that do not exceed $300,000. See notes 56, 57
infra. Section 4 provides that the registration requirements do not apply to certain
exempted transactions. The broad scope of the word "security" ( 2(1)) is apparent
from the exempted list; see note 60 infra.
15. This was effected by amendment attached to the bill on investment companies and became law on August 22, 1940. The Commission's power of acceleration
is still being debated and further proposals to amenid §8(a) were made before the
President's signature on the 1954 amendments was dry. See Proceedings at the
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ment 1 was to be widely disseminated. This registration "of securities
was to be effected by the issuer of the securities, which, by virtue of
certain definitions, included persons in control of the issuing company.
The more important information required in the registration statement
was to be disseminated in the form of a "prospectus."
Section 5 of the act in substance prohibited offers to sell or sales
of securities during the so-called waiting period and thereby made it
unlawful to sell securities prior to the effective date of the registration statement. Under Section 2(3) of the Securities Act, "sale"
was defined to include both offers to sell and sales.
In practice, dealers and underwriters, obsessed with the desire
to minimize and distribute risk, and utilizing speed of investor commitment as an answer to this compulsion, chafed under the act.:8 The
chafing was less of an irritant than it might otherwise have been because of the constitutional limitation imposed upon Section 5 and the
"oral loophole." 19 The chafing was exacerbated, on the other hand,
Annual Meeting of the Section of Corporation,Banking and Business Law of the
American Bar Association, 10 THE BUsINEss LAwym 51-53, 77-81 (Nov. 1954).
It has even been suggested that the power to grant acceleration is of such great
practical importance that discretionary failure to grant it would prohibit the public
offering of almost any security. Id. at 78.
16. This was of a prescribed and full nature, relating to the securities, the company, the management, the purpose of the issue, together with financial statements,
options, contracts and other data. See Neff, Forms for Registration of Securities
under the Acts of 1933 and 1934, 51 HARv. L. Rxv. 1354, 1355 (1938).
17. The term "issuer" (§ 2(4)) includes, in addition to an issuer of securities,
any person, directly or indirectly, controlling or controlled by the issuer or any
person under direct or indirect common control with the issuer, by virtue of its
interpolation into the definition of "underwriter" in §2(11). Such a controlling
person is not an issuer in other sections of the Securities Act. Apparently strained
interpretations have evolved, but through a determined and somewhat strait-laced
view, the Commission has been able to present a consistent statutory pattern. E.g.,
SEC Securities Act Release No. 97, pt. 4, Dec. 28, 1933, 11 FEn. REG. 10951 (1946) ;
Ira Haupt and Co., 23 S.E.C. 589 (1946); Resources Corporation International, 7
S.E.C. 689 (1940); Thompson Ross Securities Co., 6 S.E.C. 1111 (1940); Sweet's
Steel Co., 4 S.E.C. 589 (1939). To meet to a limited degree the Ira Haupt problem
and administratively to clarify the § 4(2) broker exemption problem, Rule 154 was
amended in December, 1954. SEC Securities Act Release No. 3525, Dec. 22, 1954.
18. While the security industry's anticipation of the registration steps was
apparently, and in varying degrees, not infrequent, the Commission throughout the
years has gone very slowly and exceedingly mildly in ferreting out and punishing
"jumping the gun"--a practice especially prevalent in boom times and one which
often emanates from buyer pressure as well as seller. Commission castigation, as
in Van Alstyne, Noel & Co., 22 S.E.C. 176 (1946), has been of the slap-on-the-hand
variety. Intramural action would usually be taken under the broker-dealer provisions
of the Securities Exchange Act.
19. Constitutionally, Congress had clearly not exhausted its power over the offer
and sale of securities in § 5. Cf. SEC v. Crude Oil Corp., 93 F.2d 844, 848-49
(7th Cir. 1937); Coplin v. United States, 88 F.2d 652, 656-57 (9th Cir. 1937);
Jones v. SEC, 79 F2d 617, 620 (2d Cir. 1935), rev'd on other grovids, 298 U.S.
1 (1936); SEC v. Torr, 15 F. Supp. 315, 319 (S.D.N.Y. 1936). Any nexus with
the facilities of interstate commerce (or the "Post Offices") would have been
sufficient to subject every part of the distribution of securities to federal regulation.
There is, however, a severe legislative limitation which encompasses oral offers.
Prior to the amendment, the prohibitions of § 5 were not applicable if the seller did
not use the mails or channels of interstate commerce in making the offer. Subse-
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as the publicist moved in upon a securities industry which could not
reap the fruits of any free-wheeling literature, as the lawyer appeared
at the dealers' and underwriters' elbows and warned of the growing
litigious success of the SEC and of investors, 20 and as the Commission
appeared in the guise of a conceptualistic scoffer demanding that underwriters, in a waiting period which became more and more of a cooling
off period, 2' give all the facts constituting or underlying an offer and
yet not offer the securities. In practice, sellers of securities were
hesitant to inform prospective customers during the waiting period
about a proposed new issue for fear that such activity might be held
to constitute an illegal offer 2 and thereby involve substantial legal
liabilities. The Commission recognized that the distinction between
"dissemination of information" and an "offer" was not easy to draw
and that such distinction was still more difficult for a lay customer
What concerned the Commission in trying to carry
to appreciate.'
out the purposes of the statute was that the objective of wide-spread
dissemination of information during a waiting period was not more
effectively achieved.
In the counterpoise of the interests of capital development and
of the corporate form of business (reflecting means and ability to concentrate economic power in itself) 24 and of those of protection for the
investor or potential investor, the balance required constant surveillance. The Commission attempted, within the statutory framework,
to harmonize speed and facility in obtaining capital funds in a twentieth
century enterprise 25 with full protection for the increasing number of
investors.2 6 In its job of economic reconciliation under the power
delegated to it and of making the statutory enactment better reflect
"the dictates of economic laws .

.

.

discovered by observation .

quent to the effectiveness of the registered securities, an oral offering could be made
even in interstate commerce. This was sometimes known as the "oral loophole."
Byse & Bradley, supra note 3, at 616-17.
20. See 19 SEC ANN. REP. 13-17, 99-106, 145, 158, 163-65 (1954); 10 SEC
ANN. REP. 22-29, 185-88, 190-92, 280-94, 308-14 (1945); 5 SEC ANN. REP. 95-117,
132, 191-93, 235-57 (1940).
21. See Lobell, supra note 3, at 318.
22. It has been suggested that this articulated fear may have been claimed "with
tongue in cheek." Lobell, supra note 3, at 325. Demmler and Armstrong highlight
the fear, tying it into the statute's criminal sanctions and the purchaser's right
of rescission for one year, under § 12(1). Demmler & Armstrong, supra note 2,
at 134. Senator Bush on the floor of the Senate called the waiting period one
of "considerable confusion and considerable doubt regarding the rights of an underwriter . . . offering . . . securities." 100 CONG. REc. 2343 (daily ed. March 2,
1954).
23. Sen. Hearings, supra note 2, at 24.
24. See BERLE, THE 20Tm CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 25 (1954).

25. See McCoRMICIC, UNDERSTANDING
287 (1948).
26. See KIm.xEL, SHARE OWNERSIP

THE

SECURITIES

IN THE UNITED

Acr

AND

STATES

THE

S.E.C.

passim (1952).
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worked out through human experience," 2 the Commission took repeated administrative actions designed to encourage issuers and underwriters to make available to dealers and prospective investors, during
the waiting period, the information which the statute intended that they
should have."' Thus, the distribution during the waiting period of
summaries of information in the registration statement prepared by
independent investment services 9 was sanctioned and the distribution
of so-called "red herring prospectuses" " and of identifying statements 3' to dealers was required. To permit and encourage the use
of these informal documents, the Commission issued opinions and
provided by rules 32 that their use did not necessarily constitute an
offer which could not be lawfully made prior to the effective date of
the registration statement under the then existing law. Despite these
official pronouncements, it is common knowledge that the basic information contained in registration statements was not publicized adequately during the waiting period, as had been originally contemplated.
In this setting it may be astonishing that attacks on the Securities
Act and companion legislation were not more frontal.' Early amendments had, however, taken care of some of the legislative interstices,
and companion statutes filled hiatuses. 4 There was general confidence
27. See POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 29 (rev. ed.
1954).
28. See Demmler & Armstrong, supra note 2, at 134.
29. SEC Securities Act Release No. 464, Aug. 19, 1935, 11 Fan. REG. 10954
(1946) ; id., No. 802, May 23, 1936, 11 FED. REG. 10957 (1946). Standard & Poor's
"blue cards" were a popular form of such summaries.
30. "Red herring" prospectuses derived their name from a legend in red ink
superimposed on each page of the prospectus to the effect that a registration statement
had been filed but had not yet become effective, that the information in the document was subject to correction and change, that the circular was not to be considered an offer to sell or a solicitation of an offer to buy, and that no offer to buy
or sell should be made or offer accepted until the effective date. See Sen. Hearings,
supra note 2,at 24.
31. SEC Securities Act Release No. 3447, 17 FED. RaG. 6566 (1952); id. No.
3453, 17 FED. REG. 8898 (1952).
32. See last sentence of § 19(a) (48 STAT. 85 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77s(a) (1952)) to the effect that no provision of the Securities Act shall apply to
any act done or omitted in good faith in conformity with any rule or regulation
of the Commission, even if such rule is later amended, rescinded or determined to
be invalid.
33. One reason was that socio-economic group conflict was not intensified, as,
perhaps, in the case of the National Labor Relations Act, 49 STAT. 449 (1935), as
amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-66 (1952).
34. Practitioners have always referred in official English to the statute as: the
Securities Act of 1933, as amended. It was first amended in 1934, 48 STAT. 905
(1934), when the following sections were changed: §§ 2(1), 2(4), 2(10), 3(a)(2),
3(a)(9), 3(a)(10), 3(a)(11), 4(1), former 4(3), 10(b)(1), 11(a), 11(b),
11(c), 11(e), and 13. The Motor Carrier Act of 1935 broadened the exemption
in§ 3(a) (6) to cover any security used by a common or contract carrier and issued
subject to the provisions of §20a of the Interstate Commerce Act. 49 STAT. 557
(1935). In 1945 a major amendment to §3(b), 59 STAT. 167 (1945), substituted
"$300,000" for "$100,000" in the authority of the Commission to exempt small issues
of securities from the registration requirements of the act. Reference will be
made to the abortive amendment of 1954 in this regard. See text following note
55 and notes 42, 56, and 57 infra.
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in the integrity and reasonableness of the administering agency and in
its undertakings to attempt to deal realistically with the problem. The
resistance to uprooting amendments was natural. This inhibition was
due partly to a 1929 stock market crash neurosis. 5 Yet in this frame
of legislative-administrative reference, the movement for more radical
amendment to close the gap between congressional theory and capitalist
practice gained momentum. 6
In May, 1940, broad amendment bills were introduced. When
Commission comment was requested, Jerome Frank (then Chairman
and now a judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit) suggested that the hearings be postponed to give the Commission and representatives of the securities industry an opportunity to
see whether and to what extent they could, agree on proposals. Conferences resulted in a suggested amendment to Section 8(a) which
would have authorized the Commission to accelerate the twenty-day
waiting period."
In the summer of 1940, two securities industry associations and
the two leading exchanges appointed a committee which, with a
Commission staff committee, examined the provisions of the Securities
Act and the Securities Exchange Act. The end result was the submission to Congress in the summer of 1941 of separate Commission
and industry reports."8 Extensive hearings were held, but the
impetus for amendment was sunk with the attack on Pearl Harbor. 9
In addition the following provisions of the Federal Bankruptcy Act have constituted in turn and in effect amendments to the Securities Act: §264 of Chapter X,
52 STAT. 902 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 664 (1952); §393 of Chapter XI, 52 STAT. 914
(1938), 11 U.S.C. §793 (1952); and §518 of Chapter XII, 52 STAT. 928 (1938),
11 U.S.C. §918 (1952) ; as well as §77(f), 49 STAT. 920 (1935), 11 U.S.C. §205(f)
(1952). Section 304(a) (5) of the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 53 STAT. 1153
(1939), 15 U.S.C. §77ddd(a)(5) (1952), and §24(d) of the Investment Company
Act of 1940, 54 STAT. 825 (1940), 15 U.S.C. §80a-24(d) (1952), may also be
considered amendments.
35. This has carried over into the 1955 Fulbright investigation. Hearings on
Factors Affecting the Buying and Selling of Equity Securities Before the Senate
Coninittee on Banking and Currency, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 2, 20, 35, 251, 254
et seq. (1955). See also note 11 supra.36. See, e.g., CREAMER, CAPIrrAL AND OUTPUT TRENDS IN MANUFACTURING
INDUSTRIES, 1880-1948, at 62 (1954).

37. See note 15 supra.
38. Altogether there were eighty-six proposed amendments. Forty-eight related
specifically to the Securities Act. There was agreement on thirty-three of these
between the industry and the Commission. There were, however, important areas
of disagreement (especially relating to §§ 14 and 16 of the Securities Exchange
Act). See SEC, REPORT ON PROPOSALS FOR AMENDMENTS TO THE SECURITIES ACT
OF 1933 AND THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 (1941); IBA, NASD, N.Y.
CURB EXCHANGE & N.Y. STOCK EXCHANGE REPORT ON THE CONFERENCES WITH THE
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND ITS STAFF ON PROPOSALS FOR AMENDING THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934

(1940).
39. See

FINAL REPORT OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION SUBCOMMITTEE TO THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 82d
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In 1947, a new Commission staff committee initiated "a somewhat less ambitious" program: 40 to resolve in practical operation the
statute's objectives that accurate information be disseminated among
the investors as soon as possible and that no investors commit themselves until they have had a fair opportunity to consider the full and
relevant data (in a statutory prospectus). The Commission published
an outline of tentative proposals for revising Section 5,41 but the amendatory legislation died aborning.
As a lineal descendant of the 1947 proposals, and as the progeny
of an at times uneasy, continued symbiosis of government and industry,4 the 1954 amendments were born.
The basic changes incorporated in the Securities Act Amendments Act of 1954 permit written offers to sell securities during the
Cong. 139 (1952). The Heller subcommittee more than ten years later stated quite
properly that "all parties felt that the major problem of the solicitation of offers,
the use of the prospectus, and related complexities of Section 5 of the 1933 act
should be approached and solved first . . ." and complained that failure to reach
even tentative understanding resulted in no cohesive proposal for amendment to the
subcommittee. Ibid. The SEC in its 1941 proposals did not affirmatively urge any
§ 5 changes. It did, however, consider a compromise approach which while preserving the statutory scheme would (as part of it) insure the investor's receipt of a
full prospectus before committing himself. This approach would require the investor
to have the complete prospectus for a reasonable period of time before binding himself to take the securities. A twenty-four hour locus poenitentiae was conceived.
Thus, it was contemplated that the investor would receive a statutory prospectus
complete in every respect, except for the material usually contained in the price
amendment (normally filed a day or so before the effective date) on (or just before)
the effective date. This would cause the twenty-four hour period to begin running.
The underwriter or dealer, upon the effective date, could give the purchaser the
omitted information orally and then supply it in writing later and at this point take
the firm commitment. The complete selling document was to be "made to serve its
primary function." SEC, REPoRr oN PRoPosALs FOR AMENDMENTS TO THE SECURITIES
AcT OF 1933 AND THE SEcuarrts EXCHANGE Acr OF 1934, at 10 (1941). Industry
worked out a rescission proposal. Sales could be made upon the effective date. One
business day later a statutory prospectus would be received. The investor would
be permitted to rescind, or as some opponents to the proposal in castigating it called
the right of the investor, "to welsh." IBA, NASD, N.Y. CuRB EXCHANGE, N.Y.
STOCK EXCHANGE, Op. cit.

supra note 38.

40. Loss, op. cit. supra note 3, at 248.
41. At almost precisely the same time two painstaking, intensive, and corrective
analyses of the problems encountered under the Securities Act, legislative solutions,
and especially these proposals, were published: Byse & Bradley, supra note 3; Lobell,
supra note 3. With these dissertations and Loss' book accessible, the arduous routing of industry and Commission proposals (with the SEC becoming more pliant and
flexible, in the direction of the industry's 1941 proposal) seems supererogatory.
42. On January 27, 1954, Senator Capehart, Chairman of the Committee on
Banking and Currency, and Representative Wolverton, Chairman of the Committee
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, introduced companion bills to amend provisions of the acts administered by the Commission. The next day President Eisenhower in his economic report stated: "The federal securities laws were enacted
nearly twenty years ago and have remained largely unchanged over the period.
Some modifications in these laws are needed which, while fully protecting the interests of investors, will make the capital market more accessible to businesses of
moderate size. It will also be desirable to simplify the rules and thus reduce the
cost of registration of new issues and their subsequent distribution." Sen. Hearings,
supra note 2, at 1. The bill was passed on the Senate's consent calendar on March
2, 1954. It then went to the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Coin-
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statutory period (after a registration statement has been filed with
the SEC but before it has become effective) by means of a prospectus
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission prior to its use.
This change (bringing in tow the dichotomization of "offer" from
"sale" " and the harbinger of more readable prospectuses through summary forms ") has been heralded as removing the difficult concept
of the pre-October, 1954 practice: that it was permissive (and even
obligatory under Commission administration) for an issuer or underwriter to disseminate information during the waiting period but that it
was illegal to offer or solicit offers.' Permit offers during the waiting period-is the new "direction" " from Congress to its specialized
agency. No change was made as to sales or contracts of sale or contracts to sell securities; these are still illegal prior to the effective date
of the registration statement.
Other changes are of tangential significance. Thus, the unrealistic, mandatory requirement in the Securities Act that a dealer must
deliver a prospectus in the initial distribution of a security (regardless
of how long the distribution took) and in trading transactions for
one year after the registration statement became effective " was
amended, so that delivery is now required during the actual offering
period but in no event less than forty days after the effective date of
the commencement of the public offering, whichever expires later.
merce which reported the bill favorably, except for a proposal to amend §3(b)
of the Securities Act to increase the Commission's power to exempt small issues
from $300,000 to $500,000. With the $300,000 limit, the bill was passed without
dissenting vote in either house. As the Commission analyzed it during the fall of
1953, they received and considered thirteen principal suggestions for amendments.
See Appendix at pp. 1039-40 infra.
43. Section 1 of the Securities Act Amendments Act (note 1 supra) amends
§ 2(3) to redefine the term "sale," in order to distinguish between "offers and sales."
The redefinition of "sale" required formal amendments to various sections of the
Act (§§2(11), 3(a)(11), 12, 17(a), and 22 (a)) to insert the term "offer" to
preserve existing law with respect to those particular sections. The existing exception from the term "sale" for preliminary negotiations and agreements between
an issuer and an underwriter was revised to give effect to pre-amendment interpretations to cover negotiations and agreements between a controlling person and an
underwriter prior to the filing of the registration statement.
44. Section 10(b).
Generally lawyers have been the authors of prospectuses,
and accordingly these documents have suffered from the usual turgidity of a profession obsessed by a superabundance of caution and agglutinative precedent.
45. This language has almost become a clich6 in the legislative history documentation of the amendments. See, e.g., 5en. Hearings, supra note 2, at 6; 20 SEC
ANN. REP. 2 (1955).
46. See Gilbert & Kampelman, Legislative Control of the Bureaucracy, 292
ANNALS 76, 78 (1954), adopting semantics of HYNEMAN, BuREAucRAcy IN A
DEmOcRAcY c.1 (1950).
47. Section 5(b) required and now requires that all persons use statutory prospectuses in connection with the sale of a registered security. The third clause of
§4(1) exempted dealers from the requirements of §5, except under two sets of
circumstances: any dealer not a participant in the distribution, as such, must use the
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However, certain types of investment companies which continuously

offer securities were required to use prospectuses over a longer period."8
Again, prospectuses used for longer than thirteen months required,
before the 1954 amendments, information more recent than prospectuses used for shorter periods. In order to equalize the requirements,
the act was amended to provide that, where a prospectus is used for
more than nine months after the effective date, the information contained in the prospectus must be of a date within sixteen months of

such use.
Turning to the Securities Exchange Act,49 Congress felt that
the prohibition against the extension of credit by dealers to purchasers
of new issues for six months after the offering period was unduly long.
The amendment reduced the six-month period to thirty days."0 An
ambiguity as to when-issued trading was also eliminated. 5
The Trust Indenture Act of 1939,'2 which required inclusion in
a prospectus of a summary of certain specified indenture provisions, was
amended to permit greater latitude to the Commission.53 This was
prospectus as to all transactions in the registered securities within one year from
the beginning of the offering; any dealer who participated in the distribution was
required to continue to use the prospectus in connection with the disposition of his
portion of the registered issue of securities being distributed even though the one year
period had expired. It had long been maintained that the one year period should be
reduced.
The 1947 tentative staff proposal had limited the period to three months.
48. Securities offered by open end management companies or unit investment
trusts: §24(d) of the Investment Company Act, 54 STAT. 825 (1940), 15 U.S.C.
§80a-24(d) (1952). Normally such companies register once a year. Thus, if the
reduction to forty days were to apply, independent dealers in such securities would
have been limited to a considerably shorter time with respect to the use of prospectuses than dealers engaged in distribution. See Sen. Hearings, supra note 2, at 90.
49. 48 STAT. 881 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §78a (1952).
50. Section 11(d) (1), which was the subject of the amendment, has been a
troublesome provision of the Securities Exchange Act although it had a laudable
purpose of segregating the broker-dealer function in the same person and of trying
to provide for placement of new issues with "investors rather than speculators."
H.R. REP. No. 1542, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 15, 27 (1954) ; see also SEN. REIP. No. 1036,
83d Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1954) ; H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1934) ;
SEN. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1934).
Further legislative clarification
of § 11(d) (1) would have been useful.
51. The last two sentences of § 12(d) of the Securities Exchange Act had dealt
with the subject of when-issued trading (trading in unissued securities effected in
contemplation of their issuance) on exchanges. The first of these sentences provided
ample and general authority under the homogenized but useful standard of public
interest and protection of investors used throughout the statute. The last sentence
represented an attempt to deal with the problem somewhat more precisely and in
language that, it had long been felt, was not completely apposite. See Loss &
Vernon, When-Issued Securities Trading in Law and Practice, 54 YALE L.J. 741, 766
et seq. (1945).
52. 53 STAT. 1149 (1939), 15 U.S.C. § 77aaa (1952).
53. The categorical language of § 305 (c) of the Trust Indenture Act, 53 STAT.
1154 (1939), 15 U.S.C. § 77eee(c) (1952), had been considered a possible obstacle to
the Commission's power under § 10 of the Securities Act to allow shorter prospectuses (involving in this instance, debt securities).
But see Form S-9, SEC
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done also to obviate the criticism as to over-long and unduly complicated prospectuses in the offerings of what is known commonly as
the institutional type of debt securities.
An amendment to the Investment Company Act of 1940 54 permitted investment companies which engage in continuous offering of
their shares to file an amendment to their registration statements each
year instead of filing new registration statements.55
One amendment to the Securities Act, proposed by the administration, the Commission, the industry, and initially at least by the
committees of both houses of Congress was not enacted. In the Securities Act as first passed and as in effect until 1945, the Commission
had authority to exempt small issues up to $100,000 from the provisions of the act. This permissive amendment contained in Section
3(b) of the act was in addition to the "automatic" exemptions and
also in addition to the exclusions directly provided in the act. In 1945
the act was amended to permit exemptions of issues up to $300,000." o
The amendatory proposal, whittled down from some requests made for
a higher ceiling, was for $500,000. Despite the phalanx of support
buttressed by impressive witnesses, statistics as to flotation costs, price
indices, cajoling and cogent arguments, Congress was not ready to
relax to such a degree the safeguards considered to reside in the fuller
scrutiny and administrative involvement of a registration."
Securities Act Release No. 3503, May 27, 1954; SEN. Rm. No. 1036, 83d Cong.,
2d Sess. 19 (1954) ; H.R. REP. No. 1542, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954). See note 44
.supra.
54. 54 STAT. 847 (1940), 15 U.S.C. §80a (1952).
55. Section 24(e), as added by the 1954 amendments, see note 1 supra; SEN.
REP. No. 1036, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1954) ; H.R. REP. No. 1542, 83d Cong., 2d
Sess. 30 (1954).
56. 59 STAT. 167 (1945), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (1952) ; see note 42 supra.
57. See,, e.g., Sen. Hearings, supra note 2, at 1, 5, 9, 11, 13, 18, 26, 34-54, 62,
71-74, 82, 84-85, 92-97, 102-07, 123. The principal industry proponents for expansion
of the Commission's exemptive power were the independent telephone companies, who
urged a $600,000 limit (see note 42 supra). The amendment was urged as facilitating public financing by small business, by minimizing the expense of issuing
securities as compared with a "full" registration and thus making public interstate
offerings a mode of financing more competitive with private placements. It was
maintained that the amendment would not affect existing Commission authority to
adopt safeguards, in the form of required offering circulars, subject to civil liabilities
under §§ 12 and 17 of the act for deficiencies or inaccuracies and by order, to
suspend or deny the exemption because of fraud, threatened fraud, or other violation
of the statute or of rules or regulations.
Almost the only debate on the Securities Act amendments occurred with respect
to these provisions. Thus, the present Speaker, Mr. Rayburn, stated after an
encomium on the Securities Act: "But I do think that when people want to issue
securities up to $500,000, that is a lot of money for the unsuspecting public to go
out and buy. I think when it goes above $300,000 they should be compelled to go to
the . . . Commission and lay down their financial situation. . . . I have always

feared that the time would come when someone would start whittling away the
salient provisions of these bills. . . . But I do think in the interest of the American
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With this synopsis of the action (and the one major non-action)
taken in 1954, more microscopic analysis is required of the legislative
texture. This can best be studied by minutely considering the impact
of the amendments upon the keystone provision of the Securities Act,
Section 5.8
investors and in the interest of sound financing of our corporations that it is dangerous, very dangerous, for us to raise this amount to more than $300,000." 100 CONG.
REc. 6107 (daily ed. May 12, 1954).
Representative Bennett, of Michigan, also objected, citing figures that: "In a
three month period last year $21 million of these promotional and speculative stocks
were sold under this $300,000 exemption. That adds up to about eighty-five or eightysix million dollars a year. . . . If you increase this exemption to $500,000, then you
nearly double that $86 million and thereby aggravate the present situation, which
is none too healthy at the present time. It is not a question of whether you
should do something for small business. If you are going to balance the equities
in this instance between small business and the small investor, certainly you have
to resolve all doubts in favor of the small investor because he is the fellow who is
putting up the money." 100 CoNGr. REc. 6108 (daily ed. May 12, 1954).
The balance of interest has been well stated. The greatest protection that
must be accorded is in precisely the small issues. Because of their small size and
because of the desire to keep down expenses, there is often less legal and accounting
scrutiny than might otherwise be proper, and that is required in registrations. By
the empirical working of the securities industry more completely speculative issues
are put out under $300,000 than above. The Commission has with commendable
zeal in recent years tried to reduce expenses of registration. With the expertise of
an increasing segment of the bar in these matters, the cost also should decrease.
The effect of such expertise is not only in reduced legal fees but, in addition, in the
exceedingly important item of printing costs. The difference between copies and
printer's proofs can mount into thousands of dollars. The expertise of counsel is
also shown in the ability to allocate expenses so as to maximize legally the amount
of deductible legal expenses. Despite a contrary feeling in the investment industry, the exchanges, and members of the present staff of the Commission who recommended such a change, it is submitted that the grass root objection had strong
validity. The able eponymous chairman of the Fulbright Committee tentatively considered as one of two possible new pieces of legislation in the securities regulatory
field that might be necessary a provision calling for "greater disclosure of corporate
facts by companies issuing stock under Regulation A, under §3(b)." N.Y. Times,
March 14, 1955, p. 1, col. 8; id., p. 20, col. 4; see also Sen. Hearings, supra note 35,
at 382.
58. Section 5 now provides as follows:
Sec. 5. (a) Unless a registration statement is in effect as to a security, it
shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly(1) to make use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of *the mails to sell such security through
the use or medium of any prosepectus or otherwise; or
(2) to carry or cause to be carried through the mails or in interstate commerce, by any means or instruments of transportation, any such security for the
purpose of sale or for delivery after sale.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly(1) to make use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the mails to carry or transmit any
prosepectus relating to any security with respect to which a registration statement has been filed under this title, unless such prospectus meets the requirements of section 10; or
(2) to carry or to cause to be carried through the mails or in interstate
commerce any such security for the purpose of sale or for delivery after sale,
unless accompanied or preceded by a prospectus that meets the requirements of
subsection (a) of section 10.
(c)It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to make use
of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate
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As amended in 1954, Section 5 of the Securities Act partitions
(albeit inartistically) the registration process into three stages: the
pre-filing, the waiting period (between the filing of the registration
59
statement and its effective date), and the post-effective stages.
The new Section 5(c) provides that, before a registration statement has been filed with the Commission, any use of interstate facilities or the mails to "offer to sell or offer to buy" any security " is
prohibited. Also prior to filing, Section 5 (a) prohibits sales or deliveries of the securities.6 ' The term "sale" as now defined by Section
2(3) includes "every contract of sale or disposition of a security or
interest in a security, for value." Thus, before a registration statement is filed, interstate facilities or the mails cannot be used in any
way to distribute or further the distribution of a non-exempt security.
Section 5 (b) (1) applies during the waiting period. This section
prohibits the use of interstate facilities or the mails to transmit any
"prospectus" unless it meets the requirements of Section 10, which
in turn prescribes the contents of the statutory prospectus. Since the
term "prospectus" is defined by Section 2(10) to mean a written
offer62 (with certain few exceptions), there is thus no prohibition
against oral offers even by interstate telephone during this period, as
there is before the filing. As defined and supplemented by rule and
interpretation, the written offer during the waiting period can be made
by a so-called tombstone ad,' a preliminary prospectus not dissimilar
commerce or of the mails to offer to sell or offer to buy through the use or
medium of any prosepectus or otherwise any security, unless a registration statement has been filed as to such security, or while the registration statement is
the subject of a refusal order or stop order or (prior to the effective date of
the registration statement) any public proceeding or examination under sec-

tion 8.
59. This trichotomy is also adopted by Loss, SUPPLEMENT TO SECURITIES REGULATION

(1955).

60. The term "offer to sell" is defined in §2(3) to include every attempt or
offer to dispose of, or solicitation of an offer to buy, a security or interest in a security, for value. The definition of security in §2(1) is not a restricted one. See,
e.g., SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946); SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing
Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943); United States v. Reidel, 126 F.2d 81 (7th Cir. 1942);
SEC v. Universal Service Ass'n, 106 F.2d 232 (7th Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 308
U.S. 622 (1940) ; Corporation Trust Co. v. Logan, 52 F. Supp. 999 (D. Del. 1943);
SEC v. Associated Gas and Electric Co., 24 F. Supp. 899 (S.D.N.Y. 1938).
61. As can be noted, § 5(a) in fact prohibits sales or deliveries of securities
at any time before the effective date of the registration statement.
62. An offer on iadio or television is also included.
63. Section 2(10) (b) provides that a notice, circular, advertisement, letter
or communication regarding a security is not to be deemed a prospectus if it states
from whom a § 10 statutory prospectus may be obtained and,, in addition, does no
more than identify or state the security, the price, by whom orders will be executed
and such other information as the Commission may permit. Advertisements under
this clause are known as tombstone ads. The tombstone ad, not designed as selling
literature, but only as a screening device for prospective customers sufficiently' interested in a particular security to ask for a statutory prospectus, is usually inserted
in newspapers but may be displayed otherwise. Until the 1954 amendments, a tomb-
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to the former "red-herring prospectuses," 64 a new summary prospectus, as well, theoretically, as by the complete statutory prospectus.
During the waiting period, specific prohibitions remain. As will be
noted, amended Section 5, sub-section (b) (1), prohibits transmission
of any other written offers during the waiting period; sub-section (a)
prohibits selling ' or delivering securities (in the same manner as in
the pre-filing stage); and sub-section (c) prohibits making offers
otherwise sanctioned while any public examination or proceeding looking toward a Commission stop order or refusal order under Section 8
is pending or operative.
There is no limitation on oral offers during the waiting period.6 6
Prior to October 10, 1954, oral offers over interstate telephone lines
could be made only after the effective date; now they can be made
freely during the waiting period. Since most offers in any event can
be and are made in this manner,(7 the complex tripartite mechanism of
offer by prospectus and sale may be reduced in some part to an interesting academic footnote. The Commission and critics of the widened
loophole were cognizant of the danger to the whole statutory scheme
which the relaxing amendment effected, but alternatives in the form
of monitoring oral communications (vide: wire tapping) were less
palatable and a counterattack might have endangered the entire legislative program.
After the effective date, sales may be freely made through prospectuses. This is substantially different from the sanctioned activities
during the waiting period.6" By virtue of Section 2(10), the term
''prospectus" as defined after the effective date permits supplemental
selling literature (that is, literature accompanied or preceded by a full
Section 10 prospectus).69 In any event, the full prospectus must prestone ad could not be used before the effective date. Its exclusion from the definition
of prospectus did not, however, make it less of an attempt to dispose of a security
and, hence, within the pre-1954 definition of "sale." See proposed adoption of Rule
134, SEC Securities Act Release No. 3535, 20 FED. REG. 1067 (1955).
64. See note 30 supra.
65. A sale made before the effective date without use of mails or interstate
facilities is not illegal, but the sending of a confirmation through the mails or
interstate facilities would through the brigaded interpretation of §5(b)(1) and
§2(10) constitute a violation if occurring before the effective date. As to confirmations, cf. Rule X-17A-3 (especially (a)(9)) SEC Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 2304, Nov. 13, 1939.
66. See note 19 supra.
67. See Byse & Bradley, supra note 3, at 617 & n.38.
68. By virtue of § 5(b) (2), unless the buyer has already received from some
source (seller, issuer, underwriter or dealer) a full § 10(a) prospectus, delivery
of the securities through the mails or in interstate commerce is illegal. The buyer's
prior receipt of a § 10(b) prospectus will not satisfy the specific language of
§5(b)(2). See also Rule 433, SEC Securities Act Release No. 3519, Oct. 12,
1954, as limiting preliminary prospectuses to the purposes of §5(b)(1) during
the waiting period.
69. This article will not traverse the fascinating terrain of newspaper, television
and radio comment, inspired or uninspired.- Patently a directly paid advertisement
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cede or accompany any interstate or mail delivery of the securities
under Section 5 (b) (2), and the actual entry of a stop order bars the
use of interstate facilities or the mails even to make offers.7"
The Commission has taken administrative action to complement
the 1954 Congressional action. Thus far its most publicized action has
been in promulgating a new Rule 433 "' vice the much publicized redherring regulation Rule 131.72 Under the imprimatur of Section 10(b)
directing the SEC to adopt rules permitting the use of an abbreviated
or summary prospectus, the Commission's new rule merely provides
that:
"A . . . prospectus filed as a part of the registration statement
shall be deemed to meet the requirements of section 10 . . . for
the purpose of section 5 (b) (1) . . . prior to the effective date
. provided the following conditions are met:
"(a) Such . . . prospectus contains substantially the information required by the Act and the rules . . . to be included in
a prospectus meeting the requirements of section 10(a) . . . or
contains substantially that information except for the omission of
information with respect to the offering price, underwriting discounts or commissions, discounts or commissions to dealers,
amount of proceeds, conversion rates, call prices, or other matters
dependent upon the offering price, and (b) The outside front
cover page of such . . . prospectus shall bear, in red ink, the
caption 'Preliminary Prospectus', the date of its issuance, and
the following statement printed in type as large as that generally
in the body . . .:
"A registration statement relating to these securities has been
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission, but has
not yet become effective. Information contained herein is
subject to completion or amendment. These securities may
not be sold nor may offers to buy be accepted prior to the
time the registration statement becomes effective. This prospectus shall not constitute an offer to sell or the solicitation
of an offer to buy in any State in which such offer or solicitation would be unlawful prior to registration or qualification
under the securities laws thereof."
Concurrently with the adoption of this Rule 433, the Commission
codified its 1952 restatement of acceleration policy in a new Rule
is covered by the interdictions of the statute. Just as clearly a bona fide news report
or account is not. The range in between, confused by arguments of freedom of
speech and of press, demands attention-an intriguing problem not here challenged.
Cf. Sen. Hearings, supra note 35, at 679-82, 928.
70. The mere pendency after the effective date of a proceeding or examination
under § 8 does not have this effect as it does during the waiting period.
71. SEC Securities Act Release No. 3519, Oct. 12, 1954.
72. SEC Securities Act Release No. 3177, Dec. 5, 1946; id. No. 3240, July 10,
1947.
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460, 73 to the effect that the Commission, in ruling upon requests for
acceleration of the effective date of a registration statement and in that
regard the adequacy of public information respecting the issuer, will
consider whether reasonable steps have been taken to make the information contained in the registration statement conveniently available to
underwriters and dealers, who it is anticipated will be invited to participate in the distribution of the security.
There is the limitation that prospectuses would not have to be
distributed in states where such distribution would be illegal-a realization of the break in federal-state harmony, which will be referred to
later in this article.74
From the point of the extra-administrative sanctions, a more
scrutinizing glance must be directed at the prospectuses to be disseminated during the waiting period. While the summary prospectus
is filed with the registration statement, it is not deemed part of the
registration statement for the purposes of the civil liability under Section 11."5 The exception from Section 11, designed mainly to encourage the widespread use of summary prospectuses, was justified on
a number of grounds. "[D] eficiencies in such condensed prospectuses,
if observed at the time of the Commission's processing of the registration statement and if material, may be dealt with administratively by
the Commission under existing authority by requiring the material
to be corrected and re-circulated with the changes noted. The official
Section 10(a) prospectus has to be delivered to the buyer at or before
the time he receives the securities. Finally, any deficiency in summary material which, despite the Commission's processing, might carry
through to and occur in the Section 10(a) prospectus will create liability under Section I L" 7" Administratively, the summary prospectus
does remain subject to a Commission stop order. Then, too, it also
is subject to the general provisions of Sections 12(2) and 17(a) and
to the expanding concept of the seemingly ecumenical rules promulgated under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act.77 It has
been remarked that there is this ironic twist: the issuer and the underwriters who are responsible for what goes into the summary prospectus
are exempt from civil liability under Section 11, but by this legislative
73. SEC Securities Act Release No. 3519, Oct. 12, 1954; id. No. 3536, 20 FED.
REG.

1067 (1955).

74: See text at note 82 infra.

75. Section 10(b).

76. House Hearings, supra note 2, at 40.
77. See Forer, Book Review, 100 U. OF PA. L. REv. 927, 929-31 (1952). Cases
arising under Rule X-10B-5 are increasing. See 20 SEC ANN. R P. 49 and tables
13, 14 (1955). See also Latty, The Aggrieved Buyer or Seller or Holder of Shares
in a Close Corporation wnder the S.E.C. Statutes, 18 LAw & CONTEMP. PROD. 505
(1953).
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scheme civil liability is imposed under Section 12 (2) "upon the dealer
who will have to use the summary prospectus (if at all) as he finds
it." 78

The 1954 amendments do not eliminate other statutory and practical problems but often ease them. Thus, preliminary negotiations of
the issuer with underwriters or "among underwriters who are or [who]
are to be in privity of contract with [an] issuer" were and are permitted as an exception under Section 2(3) from the definitions of
the terms "sale," "offer to sell," as well as the term "offer to buy"
-as used in Section 5 (c). The actual organization of the selling group
is advanced, in statutory theory, from the effective date of the registration statement to the filing date. The question as to what the exception
in Section 2(3) encompasses is still not clear.79 In practice the Commission has never interfered with the making of firm contracts between
issuer and underwriter, and practitioners have always included the
underwriting data prior to the effective date. The 1954 amendment
of Section 2(3) codifies two Commission interpretations. These included agreements among underwriters to which the issuer was not
a party s ° and stretched the definition of issuer in Section 2(3) to
the persons defined as issuer solely for Section 2(11), thus encompassing secondary distributions by persons in control. While the
spreading of underwriters' market risk through extended preliminary
negotiations is to be welcomed, apparently it may not be catapulted
into a legalized jumping the gun device."
Another problem involves the permissibility of when-issued trading. Section 5 (c) prohibits offers on a when-issued basis by issuers,
underwriters or dealers before the filing date. Before the 1954 amendments, Section 5 (b), which permitted such trading after the effective
date (during whatever interval might elapse before the actual issuance
of the securities), prevented sale except by complying with the prospectus requirement of that section; and it was no excuse that copies
78. Loss, SUPPLEMENT TO SECURITIES REGULATION 75 (1955).
79. Prior to the 1954 amendments, this exception presented an even greater
potential for avoidance of the full thrust of § 5 on the securities industry's normal
activities than it does now, but it is still clear that with the 1954 amendments the
organization of the selling group must be delayed until the registration statement
has been filed. The offer-to-buy prohibition was originally inserted to prevent dealers
from making offers to buy during the waiting period or, as § 5 has now been
amended, before the filing of the registration statement. In the 1954 amendments,
the words "or offer to buy" were removed to the new § 5 (c) so as to prevent dealers
from being committed to underwriters or the issuer before obtaining adequate factual
data. Parenthetically, the statutory scheme is such that an ordinary investor may
make an offer to buy a security from the issuer or an underwriter or a dealer before
the filing date, although no person in these three categories may solicit or accept
his offer or make any attempt to sell to him.
80. On the theory that the managing underwriter negotiated with the others as
agent for the issuer.
81. See note 18 supra.
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of the statutory prospectus might not have been made available by the
issuer. Since the 1954 amendments, this is equally true of any offers
on a when-issued basis, which may be made at any time after the filing
date, as well as any contracts on a when-issued basis which may be
made after the effective date. It is, of course, unlawful to make any
contracts during the waiting period.
To turn to problems de hors the statute itself, the 1954 amendments and rules promulgated thereunder have broken the evolving
federal-state coordination. Blue sky laws were patterned in general
upon procedures of the federal agency. 2 There has been manifest a
reluctance on the part of state commissions to permit offers to be made
prior to the effective date, either because their statutes are entirely
clear and forbid them or because state commissions exhibit certain
residual resentment or reluctance to move whenever the federal legislation moves.8" Various studies have been instituted looking to passage
of model state securities acts and to bring them within the permissive
provisions of the 1954 amendments.8 4 Unless this is done, the securities industry may find that the amendments have become a burden
instead of an aid.
State agencies demonstrate ambivalence between maintaining the
integrity of their evolved direction and pliability with respect to making
the federal-state pattern work. Thus, as a viable compromise, the
Secretary of State of Georgia has issued a rule permitting any dealer
or issuer to advertise freely "but strictly stating that it is not an offer
for sale. I did this to aid all concerns in following the changing regulations by the Federal Securities Act." 85 This is followed by a
naturally unreconstructed, individualistic caveat: "I would like to
call your attention to one fact, although every effort is made to administer the Securities Act of the State in such a way that it will
not make a hardship on anyone the Securities Act of Georgia is a
separate and distinct Act from the Federal Securities Act. The State
administrators of the various states' Securities Acts are finding it very
82. The new Illinois Securities Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. c.121Y, §§ 137.1-137.19
(Supp. 1954), was patterned after the Federal Securities Act prior to the 1954 amendments. See An Exanination of thw New Illinois Bhw Sky Law, 49 Nw. U.L. REV.
781, 787 (1955). On definition of "sale" and "sell" see § 137.2-E of the Illinois
Securities Law of 1953; cf. §2(3) of the Securities Act. One major difference is
that the federal act excludes from the definition of "sales" preliminary agreements
and negotiations between an issuer and underwriter; the Illinois statute does not.
In Illinois the actual organization of the selling group is not permitted until the
registration becomes effective.
83. See Letters from the Commissions of nineteen states to the law firm of author.
84. Loss, The Harvard Law School Study of State Securities Regulation, 5
HARv. L. ScHooL BULL. No. 6 (1954).
85. Letter from Ben W. Forston, Jr., Secretary of State of Georgia, to the
author, November 30, 1954, on file Biddle Law Library, University of Pennsylvania
Law School. See note 82 supra.
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necessary in order to protect the public to maintain an independence
from the Federal Securities Commission." 86
A number of legislatures of affected states do not convene until
next year; " in other states the expert body shows no present inclination to request legislative change."8
The past attempts to achieve some degree of uniformity, as reflected in the action of the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws of the American Bar Association in approving a
Uniform Sale of Securities Act in 1929,9 with the advances made
through the National Association of Securities Administrators, must
now be in part re-channeled. At the present time, work is proceeding
on a model statute to be drafted in several parts corresponding to the
divers regulatory philosophies. It has been suggested that one part
might deal with fraud, one with broker-dealer registration, and one
with securities registration. A fourth might contain general provisions essential under any of the schemes of state regulation. One of
the desiderata must now be to key as far as practical any uniform state
statute with the federal enactment. Whether and to what extent the
state laboratory of social and economic experiment will, willy-nilly,
subsume itself to a hegemony of federal regulations cannot be solved
solely by the test of what is good for a securities company of underwriters is necessarily good for the individual state or its investors. In
its thinking and even in its desire to cooperate, the individual state
administrators may use as the test for the solution of their problems
their consideration of the continued integrity and zeal of the federal
agency.
The purpose of the Securities Act amendments was limited. They
are by their very nature a half-way measure, raising practical, theoretical, and potentially litigious questions while solving others. With only
dwarf-like steps do they expedite the effectuation of the purposes of
federal securities regulation. Yet they do answer a basic complaint
of the securities industry-at least the articulated complaint short of
scuttling the Securities Act and permitting commitments without statutory prospectuses prior to the effectiveness of the registration. Much
remains to be done. But their passage does exhibit political interaction,
involving compromise of government and business, without surrender
to or the complete satisfaction of either.
86. Ibid.
87. E.g., Mississippi, Minnesota, Virginia.
88. E.g., Missouri, Utah, California, New Mexico. See note 82 supra. The new
Pennsylvania administration does not contemplate amendment of the Commonwealth's
statute in the present biennium.
89. HANDBOOK OF THE NAT'L CONFERENCE
STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS 171-204 (1929).
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AMENDMENTS TO SECURITIES ACTS

APPENDIX
SUGGESTED AMENDMENTS TO THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND THE
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 RECEIVED BY THE SEC *
Amendments of the Securities Act of 1933 to ....
1. Permit the making of offers, but not of sales during the waiting
period ...
2. Reduce from 1 year to 30 days the period during which all dealers,
whether or not participants in the initial distribution of a new issue, are
required to deliver prospectuses in connection with trading transactions
in the new issue.
3. Permit continuous and simplified registration of shares by investment companies which continuously offer shares to the public and require
prospectuses to be delivered in trading transactions in outstanding openend investment company securities so long as securities of the same class
are being offered to the public.
4. Simplify the registration and prospectus requirements . . . of
high-grade bonds.
5. Restore the broker's exemption as provided in Section 4(2) . . .
so as to give relief from the popular interpretation of the opinion of the
Commission in . . . Ira Haupt & Co., 23 S.E.C. 589 (1946).
6. Exempt from registration outstanding shares of a listed stock being
offered in connection with an employee stock purchase plan and simplify
further the registration requirements of unissued shares of a listed stock
being so offered.
7. Exempt from registration all securities . . . registered under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and dealt in for more than 3 years on a
registered national securities exchange, and exempt additional issues of
such securities.

8. Exempt from the prospectus requirements brokerage transactions
in listed securities when the sale is made on an agency basis and agent's
compensation is disclosed to and paid by the buyer.
* Hearings Before the Subcommittee on S. 2846 of the Senate Connmittee on
Banking and Currency, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1954) ; Hearings Before the Howse
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on HR. 7550 anld S. 2846, 83
Cong., 2d Sess. 13-14 (1954).
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Amendments of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to ....
9. Prohibit the extension of credit by a broker-dealer to a customer
on a new issue of securities only if broker-dealer sold the securities to the
customer or purchased the securities for the customer on a solicited order,
and only while broker-dealer was engaged in the distribution of the securities and for 4 days thereafter.
10. Reduce the waiting period from 30 days to 10 days between the
filing and effectiveness of applications for registration of additional issues
of listed securities and remove restrictions on registration for when issued
trading and with respect to securities to be issued or sold in connection with
a reorganization under the Public Utility Holding Company Act or the
Railroad Reorganization Act.
11. Amend § 16(b) to limit profits recoverable on behalf of a corporation from officers, directors, and 10 percent stockholders in short swing
trading in the corporation's stock, . . . [thus] to provide a statutory
limit upon liability smaller in amount than now permitted by the courts
in construing the statutory term profits realized.
12. Require the Commission to proceed by order rather than by rule
or regulation if [it] changes a rule of a national securities exchange to
afford the exchange the right to a court appeal.
Amendment of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 to .

...

13. Permit general use of the title Investment Counsel by persons
registered as investment advisers even though not primarily engaged in
the rendering of investment supervisory services.

